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chapter three
Rudolf Bultmann on Myth, History,  
and the Resurrection
rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) was one of the most significant and 
controversial new testament theologians of the twentieth century. Praised 
as a genius who opens a new future for theology or vilified as a heretic 
who threatens to destroy the christian faith, Bultmann cannot be ignored.1 
his contributions to new testament exegesis (especially form criticism), 
theological hermeneutics,2 the relationship between theology and history, 
theological engagement with philosophy, and, most significantly for our 
purposes, his program of demythologizing the new testament, have pro-
vided generations of theologians and biblical scholars with invaluable tools 
for interpretation. Bultmann is also perhaps one of the most consistently 
misunderstood and misinterpreted theologians of the twentieth century.3 
critics vehemently decry his work without always understanding it, and 
even those sympathetic to his project vary widely in their interpretations.
Bultmann was primarily a new testament scholar. his texts Jesus4 and 
Theologie des Neuen Testaments5 are considered classics in new testament 
1. indeed, there has been something of a resurgence of interest in Bultmann in the 
last decade, thanks in part to the appearance of recently unpublished letters and other 
documents from Bultmann’s Nachlass as well as a new biography of Bultmann: ham-
mann, Rudolf Bultmann. For a new introduction in english, see congdon, Rudolf Bult-
mann. For a collection of essays on the lingering legacy of Bultmann in contemporary 
new testament studies, see longnecker and Parsons, Beyond Bultmann. 
2. For an especially cogent discussion of Bultmann’s program of demythologizing as 
it relates to theological hermeneutics, see ricoeur, “Preface to Bultmann.”
3. david congdon is particularly concerned to rehabilitate Bultmann after genera-
tions of criticisms and frequent misunderstandings. 
4. Bultmann, Jesus. et: Jesus and the Word.
5. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments. et: Theology of the New Testament.
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studies. More specifically, he was especially interested in the Johannine cor-
pus and the letters of Paul. his treatments of the gospel of John and Paul’s 
letters to the corinthians reveal a masterful understanding of these tradi-
tions. as a new testament scholar, however, Bultmann’s work extended 
into other fields, such as theological hermeneutics, systematic and philo-
sophical theology, and the philosophy of history.6 his work is influenced 
by Martin heidegger’s existential philosophy7 and this influence finds its 
most powerful manifestation in Bultmann’s program of demythologizing.8
Bultmann on Myth
The question of myth in the new testament pervades Bultmann’s work. 
For Bultmann the world-picture of the new testament is fundamen-
tally a mythical world-picture. The universe is perceived as a three-tiered 
structure, with God in heaven “above,” hell “below,” and this world as the 
battlefield of good and evil supernatural forces. history does not proceed 
according to immutable laws, but is constantly manipulated by supernatu-
ral intervention. For Bultmann the fundamental question concerning myth 
in the new testament is whether the new testament kerygma contains 
a truth that is in some way independent of the mythical world-picture of 
the new testament.9 if the new testament kerygma is inseparable from 
the mythical world-picture of the new testament, then its truth is lost to 
modern generations who can no longer accept this mythical world-picture. 
if the truth of the new testament kerygma can be discerned apart from 
the mythical world-picture in which it is expressed, then it is the task of 
the theologian to demythologize the new testament to understand the 
kerygma in its significance for faith. 
6. Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, 4. et: “rudolf Bultmann: an attempt to understand 
him.” Barth understands the boundary between new testament exegesis and systematic 
theology to have been abolished in Bultmann’s own work.
7. in discussion with Kuhlmann (see Kuhlmann, “Zum theologischen Problem der 
existenz”) Bultmann elaborates on the relationship between his theological interpre-
tation of existence and human being, on the one hand, and heidegger’s philosophical 
interpretation of existence and human being, on the other. see Bultmann, “die Ge-
schichtlichkeit des daseins und der Glaube.” 
8. For a contemporaneous summary of Bultmann’s program of demythologizing and 
its impact on continental theology, see tillich, “european discussion of the Problem.”
9. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 16. et: “new testament and 
Mythology.”
rudolf bultmann on myth, history, and the resurrection 
43
Bultmann recognizes the impossibility of simply repristinating the 
mythical world-picture of the new testament because the modern scien-
tific age has no room within it for recourse to the spirit world of the new 
testament. to accept this world-picture blindly is to perform a sacrificium 
intellectus and to make acceptance of it a demand of faith is to reduce faith 
to a work.10 Modern women and men are pervasively informed and influ-
enced by modern science, and, for Bultmann,
People cannot use electric lights and radios and, in the case of ill-
ness, take advantage of modern medical and clinical means, and at 
the same time believe in the spirit and wonder world of the new 
testament. and whoever intends to do so must be aware that they 
can profess this as the attitude of christian faith only by making 
the christian proclamation unintelligible and impossible for the 
present.11
if the christian kerygma has a universal truth, then it must be possible to 
express it independently of its first-century mythical form, especially if the 
kerygma is to speak a powerful word to those who no longer inhabit such 
a world-picture. if this is not possible, then the power and relevance of the 
christian proclamation has faded along with the cultural forms of the first 
century. if it is to be salvific, the kerygma must be communicable to every 
time and every place, without demanding that hearers accept the mythical 
world-picture of the new testament in which it was originally expressed. 
This does not mean, however, that the kerygma is simply “accommodated” 
to modern culture, as many critics charge (against Bultmann and, perhaps 
with more justification, against his liberal forebears); rather, Bultmann’s 
program seeks to clarify first what the christian kerygma is, and only then 
to make it relevant to modern people12 (something akin to Paul tillich’s 
method of correlation).
david congdon has proposed the conceptual framework of “constan-
tinianism” and “translationism” to describe Bultmann’s theological project 
10. For this notion of forced acceptance of an alien world-picture as a sacrificium 
intellectus and a reduction of faith to a work Bultmann is drawing on the work of her-
rmann in Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott im Anschluss an Luther dargestellt. et: Com-
munion of the Christian. 
11. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 18. 
12. congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, xxvi. congdon goes on to suggest that 
Bultmann’s theological program is best understood as “missionary” theology, insofar as 
“clarifying the faith for people in a particular cultural situation is the very definition of 
the missionary enterprise.” ibid. 
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of demythologizing. specifically, congdon describes “constantinianism” as 
a “nondialectical-nonmissionary theology that confuses the kerygma with 
a cultural worldview” and “translationism” as a “dialectical-missionary 
theology that differentiates the kerygma from every culture on the basis of 
God’s transcendent extraneity.” he goes on to give a more precise synopsis 
of Bultmann’s project: 
[Bultmann’s] missionary hermeneutic therefore entails (a) the 
criticism of constantinianism and (b) the recontextualization 
[i.e. translation] of the kerygma. specifically, the latter involves 
(1) the appropriating work of situating the kerygma within the 
present cultural-historical situation and (2) the transpropriating 
work of freeing the kerygma for new cultural-historical situations 
in the future . . . a missionary theology must therefore take in-
tercultural and crosscultural translation as its starting point and 
mode of operation . . . if a hermeneutic is going to be unreserv-
edly missionary, it cannot shrink from recognizing that the very 
conceptualities with which both past biblical writers and pres-
ent interpreters articulate the kerygma are themselves elements 
of particular cultures that the kerygma crosses in its missionary 
movement through history. This is one of the key insights pro-
vided by Bultmann’s theology.13 
in terms of Bultmann’s method, this raises three important questions: 
What is the new testament kerygma? What is myth? and what is 
demythologizing? 
First, it is necessary to understand what the new testament kerygma 
is before asking about the possibility and promise of demythologizing it.14 
The new testament kerygma, simply put, is the proclamation of God’s sav-
ing act in Jesus the christ. This is proclaimed in the word of address, but 
the proclamation itself is paradoxical: God’s eschatological act takes place 
in human history, in a historical person, but precisely because it is historical 
it cannot be proved to be eschatological. The proclamation presents itself as 
a scandal and faith in this proclamation is a risk precisely because the act of 
God cannot be verified by historical research.15 The kerygma as presented 
in the new testament assumes mythological forms (e.g., the pre-existent 
son of God emptying himself and becoming flesh), but the essence of the 
13. ibid., 572–73.
14. Bultmann finds attempts at demythologizing already at work in the new testa-
ment itself (e.g., the Gospel of John in relation to the synoptic gospels).
15. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 48.
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kerygma, that God has acted in Jesus the christ pro me, if this is to make a 
claim on modern people, must be demythologized.
Before the new testament kerygma can be demythologized, it is first 
necessary to define myth. in Bultmann’s estimation myth accomplishes 
two goals. First, myth expresses the transcendent in worldly, objectifying 
terms.16 early cultures used mythical expressions to communicate their 
understanding of the strange, the surprising, or the mysterious.17 Myth 
expresses the basic understanding that the human is not master of the uni-
verse but exists in a world full of mystery that is beyond human control.18 
second, the true intention of myth is not to provide an objective picture of 
the world, but rather to express how human beings understand themselves 
in relation to their world. This is the difficulty of myth: the form of myth 
attempts to give worldly objectivity to the unworldly,19 but the substance of 
myth must be interpreted, not in cosmological but rather in anthropologi-
cal (i.e. existential) terms.20 
For example, christian mythology speaks of the transcendence of 
God in spatial terms. rather than speak philosophically about the nature of 
transcendence, the new testament prefers to imagine this transcendence 
in terms of spatial distance: God reigns “above” in heaven. evil is likewise 
described in spatial terms and is personified in the form of demons who 
dwell “below” in hell. in order to overcome evil, a battle must ensue in 
which the champion of good defeats the forces of evil. What is expressed 
in these myths is the understanding that the world (and humanity’s place 
within it) does not find its end in itself, but depends upon powers at work 
beyond human control. Thus mythology should not be interrogated in 
terms of the content of its objectifying representations, but in terms of the 
understanding of human existence expressed by these myths.21 For Bult-
mann the issue at hand is the truth expressed by the myth, and faith in this 
truth—if it is to be meaningful today—cannot be bound to or limited by 
the mythical world-picture of the new testament.
16. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 182. et: “on the 
Problem of demythologizing” (1952).
17. ibid., 180–81.
18. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 19.
19. as Bultmann himself puts it, “Der Mythos objektiviert das Jenseitige zum Dies-
seitigen.” “neues testament und Mythologie,” 48. 
20. ibid., 22.
21. ibid., 23.
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an additional question regarding myth in the new testament con-
cerns the method of demythologizing the new testament witness in or-
der to make it relevant to modern people. The term “demythologizing” 
(Entmythologisierung)22 is, by Bultmann’s own admission, problematic.23 
This term implies the elimination of myth, as if myth were a disposable 
husk containing a kernel of truth, which is how myth was often understood 
in the nineteenth century. For Bultmann myths are to be interpreted but 
not eliminated, because the form cannot be eliminated without also endan-
gering the content. instead, the kerygma is always contained and expressed 
in a particular cultural form, but the kerygma itself can and must be trans-
lated into the cultural forms of those to whom it is addressed.24 For the new 
testament writers, that cultural form was the mythical world-picture of the 
first century. For modern people a very different cultural form is opera-
tive, which is why the new testament kerygma must be demythologized, or 
translated, from an alien cultural form into a familiar cultural form. 
it is vitally important to understand Bultmann on this point because 
this is a frequent cause of misunderstanding. Bultmann is not suggesting 
that there is a linear progression from myth, through demythologizing, to 
a “pure kerygma” stripped of any mythical form. That would presume that 
myth is something belonging solely to the past, while we more enlightened 
contemporary people have transcended myth.25 This is by no means the 
22. With congdon, i have chosen to translate the term Entmythologisierung with the 
gerund “demythologizing” rather than the more common “demythologization” to accent 
Bultmann’s insistence that this is a continual process and not one step in a method that is 
finished before moving on to the next step. 
23. despite the near-universal identification of demythologizing with Bultmann 
and his theology, Bultmann did not coin the term. it was first used in a 1914 review of 
herrmann’s Ethik by hermann strathmann, but Bultmann most likely borrowed it from 
hans Jonas’s study of augustine published in 1930. For more on the history of the term, 
see congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 693. 
24. it would be a mistake to assume that Bultmann believes it possible to eliminate 
the mythical husk of the kerygma by translating it into “nonmythical” scientific language 
because, for Bultmann, the modern scientific world-picture is just as mythical in its own 
way as the new testament mythical world-picture; it just happens to be “our” myth. as 
congdon points out, “science has not replaced myth because science is itself mythical, 
in that both myth and science perpetuate a false understanding of God, the world, and 
ourselves—myth unreflectively and science reflectively.” ibid., 608.
25. This is precisely how earlier historians and theologians (such as strauss) under-
stood myth. ingolf ulrich dalferth (see below) turns this conception on its head and 
critiques the myth of logos in order to move beyond a facile opposition between these 
two concepts.
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case, however, because every age has its myths precisely because every age 
has its unique cultural form and world-picture. demythologizing, there-
fore, is not one stage in a progression from a mythologized kerygma to a 
demythologized, naked, “pure” kerygma. The kerygma will always be ex-
pressed in a particular cultural form, with its particular myths. The purpose 
is to translate the kerygma from an alien world-picture into a familiar one, 
which means that the task of demythologizing must continue as long as the 
christian faith endures. The point is not to eliminate myth; rather, the point 
is to recognize myth as myth so to create space for the kerygma to makes its 
claim on our lives here and now.26 demythologizing, then, is always a task 
in hermeneutics: it is an act of interpretation.27
in order to understand Bultmann’s method of demythologizing, it 
is first necessary to understand his conception of history and existential 
interpretation. Bultmann understands history as the “field of human 
decisions.”28 even the interpretation of history (perceiving a historical 
process) is itself a historical act. What separates human beings from other 
creatures is that human beings are aware of themselves standing at least 
partially outside the causal nexus of natural and historical processes; they 
have been given the freedom of choice.29 The human being is given the 
opportunity to choose between authentic and inauthentic existence.30 au-
thentic human existence is existence in which individuals become respon-
sible for their own life, and this includes opening themselves to the future. 
Thus human historical life is never complete, but stretches into the future 
of limitless opportunities for choice.31 
For Bultmann this reality is understood in light of the dual possibility 
of authentic and inauthentic existence. in inauthentic existence, individu-
als regard themselves solely in terms of the past and present, whereas in 
authentic existence, individuals understand themselves primarily in terms 
26. see congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 825n329.
27. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 18.
28. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1961), 130. et: “on the 
Problem of demythologizing” (1961).
29. This is reminiscent of schleiermacher’s discussion of relative freedom, relative 
dependence, and absolute dependence in the Glaubenslehre, where he proposes that the 
human being is relatively free and relatively dependent within the causal nexus of human 
and natural relations and processes, but is absolutely dependent on God. 
30. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1961), 130. For more on 
this aspect of Bultmann’s thought, see harrisville, “Bultmann’s concept.” 
31. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1961), 130.
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of the future.32 Myth, according to Bultmann, intends to speak of human 
existence, and thus he sees the need for an existential interpretation of 
myth, or what congdon calls a “missionary translationism” in which “a 
participatory mode of God-talk takes the hermeneutical form of intercul-
tural translation.”33 demythologizing seeks to determine the intention of 
myth to address authentic human existence here and now, not its theoreti-
cal description of the world.34
The task of demythologizing cannot begin without first justifying its 
use. is demythologizing a necessary theological endeavor? in other words, 
can christian faith dispense with the mythical world-picture in which it 
was first expressed? Bultmann insists that this task is both possible and 
necessary, because the “mythological” in the new testament transmits 
a meaning and an understanding of human existence itself. The key, for 
Bultmann, is to translate this meaning from its original expression in a 
first-century mythical world-picture.35 to do otherwise is simply to remy-
thologize the kerygma in such a way that it says nothing to modern people 
in their own situation.36 
The concept of “world-picture” (Weltbild) plays a central role in Bult-
mann’s theology and must be defined precisely in order to understand what 
Bultmann is proposing in his demythologizing program. according to 
congdon,
The category of Weltbild, as Bultmann uses it, thus refers to the 
general cultural framework—that is, the matrix of social relations 
constituted by shared implicit norms, assumptions, practices, 
customs, and concepts—that people presuppose in their everyday 
lives. it is the condition for the possibility of one’s sociohistorical 
existence. culture names that plastic and hybrid nexus of norma-
tive institutions and ideas that people in a particular historical 
situation take for granted . . . no Weltbild, whether mythical or 
scientific, ancient or modern, western or nonwestern, is ever final 
or secure. as Bultmann puts it, everyone “knows that all the re-
sults of science are relative and that any world-picture worked out 
yesterday, today, or tomorrow can never be definitive.”37
32. ibid., 131.
33. congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 688. 
34. ibid., 449.
35. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 184.
36. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1961), 134–35.
37. congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 654–55. Quoting Bultmann, “Zum 
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demythologizing essentially is recognition of the objectifying nature 
of the mythical world-picture of the new testament, which, congdon sug-
gests, “uncritically confuses its divine subject matter (revelation) with a par-
ticular sociocultural matrix of presuppositions, precisely because the lack 
of differentiation between divine and human was an implicit norm of the 
ancient Weltbild.”38 Just such a critical distance is needed to avoid conflating 
the kerygma with its particular cultural form, which congdon describes as 
“a constantinian distortion of the gospel kerygma into a piece of cultural 
propaganda.”39 Based on this awareness, demythologizing interprets this 
mythical presentation in order to translate the new testament kerygma in 
terms of our own cultural forms and our own world-picture. The critic does 
not make a modern scientific world-picture the standard for interpreting 
the biblical texts, because this is simply to impose a foreign world-picture 
onto the new testament. rather, the critic seeks to determine the deeper 
intention of the biblical writings within their own mythical form and then 
to translate that deeper intention into other cultural frameworks.40 
Bultmann is not the first theologian to apply the method of demy-
thologizing to the new testament. But these earlier attempts (strauss,41 
schleiermacher, von harnack, etc.) failed in Bultmann’s estimation because 
these theologians did not fully comprehend the task and intent of demy-
thologizing. They sought only to eliminate the myth, but more often than 
not they eliminated the kerygma along with it. in the case of von harnack 
and other liberal theologians, they thought they could eliminate myth in 
order to uncover the essential kernel of a supposedly timeless religious and 
moral truth. The kerygma was reduced to a moral idea or a religious ethic, 
and the kerygma qua kerygma (the message of God’s eschatological act of 
salvation in Jesus the christ) was lost.42 What remained was a supposedly 
“timeless” religious and ethical truth that was in fact fully synonymous with 
the culturally-conditioned world-picture of liberal Protestantism. The goal 
of demythologizing in Bultmann’s estimation is not to eliminate the myth 
Problem der entmythologisierung” (1951), 181. 
38. congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 659.
39. ibid.
40. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 184. This is the pro-
cess congdon describes as the critique of “constantinianism.” 
41. see Backhaus, Kerygma und Mythos.
42. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 24–25.
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but to disclose the truth of the kerygma qua kerygma for people who do not 
inhabit a first-century mythological world-picture.43
Bultmann on History
The formal study of history was firmly established in university curricula 
after the First World War, at which point historical criticism became an 
invaluable tool for theologians and biblical scholars who availed themselves 
of this methodology to facilitate the development of form, redaction, and 
source criticism in the interwar period. Theology developed an enduring 
relationship to history and the full weight of historical criticism was brought 
to bear on the biblical texts and the traditions of the early church. This gen-
eration of historical critics distinguished itself from the nineteenth-century 
theologians interested in the historical Jesus by applying their method not 
only to the life of Jesus and the early church, but to the sources that con-
tain these traditions as well. This hermeneutical move allowed the interwar 
theologians to critique the texts themselves to determine what traditions 
within the texts are authentic accounts, and to interpret those texts in 
light of the present situation. Most significant for Bultmann’s project, the 
continuing development of existential philosophy led theology in new and 
potentially fruitful directions.44 Bultmann, one of the leading advocates of 
an existential interpretation of biblical texts, also developed a philosophy of 
history, which he first presented in his text Jesus in 1926 and later outlined 
in his Gifford lectures of 1955 on the topic of history and eschatology.45
Bultmann understands the primitive philosophy of history in ancient 
cultures as proceeding from pre-critical mythical thinking. Before ancient 
cultures wrote history, they referred to the past in terms of myths.46 he 
locates the origin of historiography proper in peoples who became a na-
tion. only when a self-conscious political identity is achieved can a cul-
ture produce genuine history. These historical narratives may be infused 
43. ibid., 26.
44. Theological engagements (especially by Bultmann) with existential philosophy 
are based largely on the early work of Martin heidegger (1889–1976), particularly his 
landmark text Sein und Zeit (1927), et: Being and Time. Bultmann was also in corre-
spondence and debate with another German existential philosopher, Karl Jaspers, whose 
thought is well summarized in his 1937 lectures in english as Philosophy of Existence.
45. Bultmann, History and Eschatology.
46. ibid., 12.
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with remnants of pre-critical mythology, but the shared experience of a 
political society creates the opportunity and luxury of historical reflection 
on the past. at this stage of historical reflection, as in ancient Greece, his-
tory is concerned exclusively with the past and does not intend to make 
judgments on the present or the future in light of historical knowledge. in 
other words, historiography has not yet concerned itself with determining 
meaning in history.
historiography in ancient israel developed in different directions. 
here the experiences and deeds of the people of israel, not the politics of 
a state, were the center of historical reflection. The community and its his-
tory developed in terms of their relationship to God, and thus supernatu-
ral intervention was accepted as part of history. God’s intervention in the 
life of the people and the conduct of the people in light of their relation to 
God served as examples for the present, and thus ancient israel developed 
an understanding of historiography as serving to inform the present life 
of the community.47
By the time of the writing of the new testament, historical under-
standing among the Greeks had developed into a specific learned discipline. 
The development in Judaism of an eschatological view of history and the 
more “secular” Greek understanding of history clashed in the new testa-
ment. By the time of the new testament, according to Bultmann, history 
had been “swallowed up” by eschatology.48 The early christians understood 
themselves and the church not as historical, but eschatological phenomena. 
The christian community believed that it lived not in the present world, 
but in the new age that is already breaking into the world but is not yet 
fully realized. This eschatological radicalizing of history created new prob-
lems for the early church. The delay of the Parousia forced a reevaluation of 
previous assumptions and expectations, resulting in a “re-historicizing” of 
eschatology in Pauline and Johannine literature.49 The christian movement 
became an institution; the eschatological community became a histori-
cal phenomenon. as the early twentieth-century French roman catholic 
theologian alfred loisy quipped, “Jesus came preaching the kingdom, but 
what arrived was the church.”50
47. ibid., 19.
48. ibid., 37.
49. ibid., 38.
50. loisy, L’Évangile et l’Église. et: Gospel and the Church. 
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Bultmann interprets Paul in light of his eschatology and anthropolo-
gy.51 For Paul, according to Bultmann, history is understood in light of es-
chatology; Paul’s apocalyptic understanding of history is grounded firmly 
in his anthropology.52 Paul recognizes meaning in history, but this meaning 
is not fully known and realized in history itself. Meaning in history is given 
by God, who gives grace to sinners. Thus history for Paul becomes the his-
tory of the individual coram deo and not primarily the history of the nation 
or community. each human being has a personal history, and each person’s 
history is determined by a series of decisions in every new situation. each 
new decision is informed by prior decisions, or by each person’s past. in 
order to enter into each new moment freely, each person must become free 
from the past. The problem, for Paul, is that the human being does not wish 
or will to be free from the past. This is the essence of sin. The christian, 
however, lives in freedom—the freedom to decide—such that each situa-
tion is a call to decision and a call to freedom. This freedom is given by the 
grace of God, which appeared most fully in Jesus the christ. 
to be justified by faith, in Bultmann’s reading of Paul, is to be set free 
from the past, to enter into a historical life of free decisions.53 Thus faith, 
for Bultmann, is characterized by a radical openness to the future. This 
faith is a risk because the future remains unknown to us. Faith involves 
free openness to the future and grants freedom from anxiety in the face of 
nothingness. This freedom is not a decision of the will, but is given in faith 
itself through grace.54 Thus, for Bultmann, eschatology, faith, and history 
are inexorably linked. only by understanding and thereby being separated 
from the past can one be open to the future, but the fact that one will always 
remain uncertain about the future is the risk of faith.
in terms of historical method, there are two primary issues for Bult-
mann: the problem of hermeneutics and the question of the objectivity of 
51. Bultmann treats the concept of history, anthropology, and eschatology of Paul 
in several essays, most notably “Geschichte und eschatologie im neuen testament,” et: 
“history and eschatology in the new testament”; “römer 7 und die anthropologie des 
Paulus,” et: “romans 7 and the anthropology of Paul”; and in Theologie des Neuen Testa-
ments, the first sub-section, “die anthropologischen Begriffe,” of the first section, “die 
Theologie des Paulus,” of the second part, “die Theologie des Paulus und des Johannes,” 
193–226.
52. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, 41. For an excellent discussion of Paul’s 
anthropology and the “inner human being,” see Betz, “concept of the ‘inner human 
Being.’”
53. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, 41–47.
54. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 77–78.
rudolf bultmann on myth, history, and the resurrection 
53
historical knowledge.55 First, there is always a problem of hermeneutics 
in doing history. Because history is based on sources and tradition, every 
work of historical investigation is also a work of interpretation. historical 
documents must be understood if they are to be used to reconstruct the 
historical past. as the discipline of history developed, historians gained a 
deeper appreciation of the problem of hermeneutics in relation to histori-
cal knowledge. First, philology was used to interpret the literary structures 
of texts, and later psychology was employed to understand the personal 
situation of the author of a text. For Bultmann there is a third means to 
historical knowledge, and that is the “pre-understanding” of the histori-
ans themselves.56 There are several questions a historian must pose before 
working with a text: What is my interest in interpreting these sources? 
Which questions direct me to approach these texts? For what purpose will 
i deploy my interpretation?57 These questions aid the historian in discover-
ing the motives for historical investigation. and so for the historian there 
must first be a relation in life (Lebensverhältnis) to the material if there is 
to be a genuine understanding of it.58 This is possible because interpreter 
and subject live in the same historical world. These motives for historical 
inquiry and this “relation in life” to the subject matter inevitably lead to 
Bultmann’s second question, namely whether it is possible to have objec-
tive knowledge of history.
here the distinction between the facts and the meaning of history 
becomes crucial and it is important to mention here the distinction the 
German language can make between two senses of history. There are two 
words in German for what we in english simply call “history”: Geschichte 
and Historie. in everyday usage these terms can be and often are used 
interchangeably, but in technical usage their meanings are strictly distin-
guished. Geschichte (related to the verb geschehen, meaning “to occur”) 
can be used to refer to what has happened in the past, but in its more 
technical use it refers to the effects and the significance of the past, the past 
as it continues to exert its influence in and on history. Historie (ultimately 
55. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, 110ff.
56. ibid., 113.
57. Bultmann insists not only that historians approach history as historical beings 
with specific questions and demands of history, but also that history itself makes de-
mands on historians. only when historians are prepared to hear the demands of his-
tory, to listen to history as an authority, are they prepared to understand history. see 
Bultmann, Jesus, 7–8.
58. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, 113.
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derived from the latin word historia, which is cognate with the english 
word “history” but in later latin takes on the more precise meaning of 
knowledge of the past gained through investigation), when distinguished 
from Geschichte, means the past as it actually happened, specifically as it 
is accessible to historical research; Historie also refers to the results of his-
torical research. Historie, when used as a technical term, by its very nature 
is always accessible to historical research and can be described as “facts”; 
Geschichte might be accessible to historical research or it might not, just as 
it might be a fact or it might not. 
a few examples will help to clarify this distinction in its various per-
mutations. it is possible for the historian to have objective knowledge of 
certain historical (historisch) facts, e.g., my order of an indiana iPa at my 
local bar last evening, which is a historical (historisch) fact but not a historic 
(geschichtlich) event because it will in all likelihood have no deeper mean-
ing or enduring significance for anyone. it is also possible for the historian 
to have objective knowledge of certain historical (historisch) facts, e.g., the 
assassination of abraham lincoln on april 14th, 1865, or the attacks on 
the Pentagon and the World trade center on september 11th, 2001, both 
of which are, at the same time, historic (geschichtlich) events because of 
their deeper meaning and enduring significance. here, though, it is im-
possible for the historian to have truly objective knowledge of the historic 
(geschichtlich) significance of these events for at least two reasons: first, the 
meaning and significance of these events is still unfolding in complex and 
unforeseen ways and will very likely continue to do so long into the future; 
and second, historians are themselves caught up in the effects of the events 
they are investigating and their involvement will necessarily color their 
interpretation of those events. Finally, it is also possible for something to 
have profound historic (geschichtlich) meaning and significance but remain 
unverifiable as a historical (historisch) fact: e.g., the resurrection of Jesus. 
The distinction becomes especially critical in terms of the death and resur-
rection of Jesus, because the two terms overlap in this case. The crucifixion 
and death of Jesus are both historical (historisch)—they actually happened 
in history and can be verified by historical research—and historic (geschich-
tlich)—they have lasting significance and meaning for history. The resur-
rection of Jesus, however, is not a historical (historisch) event—it cannot be 
verified by historical research, and thus cannot be proven to have actually 
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occurred in history—but it is a historic (geschichtlich) event—it has lasting 
effects and significance for history.59
history is a process that is more than single, isolated events, because 
these events are connected by the chain of cause and effect. how these 
events relate to one another and influence one another is not within the 
realm of purely objective knowledge. The meaning of history is only gained 
by subjective interpretation of history, and because there are a multitude of 
possible perspectives in historical inquiry, there will also be a multitude of 
interpretations of history. This subjective character of historical inquiry is 
inevitable in the interpretation of history, because the historian is always 
also a historical being with a historical life and with concrete concerns, 
which means the interpretation of history will not be complete until the 
end of history itself.
For Bultmann, the inherent subjectivity of the historian’s perspective 
involves an existential encounter with history.60 history is meaningful to 
the historian only when the historian stands within history, and histori-
cal experiences are only objectively known because the historian also lives 
these experiences as a subject. Thus historical phenomena only have sig-
nificance “in relation to the future for which they have importance.”61
59. For an analysis of the importance of this distinction specifically in Bultmann’s 
theology, see Perrin, The Promise of Bultmann, 33–56. For a detailed analysis of the histo-
ry of these terms and their use in theological discussions in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, see hege, Faith at the Intersection of History and Experience: The Theology of 
Georg Wobbermin, chap. 2, “Geschichte und Historie: The Problem of Faith and history,” 
15–77. Making even finer distinctions than is possible with Historie and Geschichte, her-
berg suggests that in the theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there are in 
fact five meanings of the word “history”: 1. history as past facts; 2. history in opposition 
to the timeless or the eternal; 3. history as it influences the future course of events (i.e. 
Geschichte); 4. history as constitutive of the essence of the human being (its key sense in 
reinhold niebuhr’s work); and 5. history as existentially self-constituting the human be-
ing in face of an open future (its key sense in Bultmann’s work). herberg, “Five Meanings 
of the Word ‘historical.’” despite some hesitation to insist on a strict distinction between 
Historie and Geschichte when translating Bultmann’s work (especially in the translations 
of roy harrisville and schubert ogden), a practice also affirmed by david congdon, i 
believe that the distinction is worth retaining because of the greater opportunity for clar-
ity and nuance. Thus for the remainder of these chapters i will use the english “historic” 
to translate geschichtlich and “historical” to translate historisch. Because english does not 
distinguish between the two terms in their nominal or adverbial forms, i will indicate the 
German in parentheses if the meaning would otherwise be unclear.
60. Bultmann, Jesus, 7–8.
61. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, 120.
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now that we have inquired into Bultmann’s conceptions of myth and 
history, a further question presents itself: what is the relationship between 
myth, history, and faith in the theological analysis of the resurrection of 
Jesus of nazareth?
Bultmann on the Resurrection
as we have already noted, use of the term “demythologizing” is, by Bult-
mann’s own admission, problematic. The term inaccurately implies the 
elimination of myth, though Bultmann’s own intention is not to eliminate 
but rather to interpret the myths of the new testament. Bultmann oper-
ates with a precise definition of myth, so that an accurate understanding 
of this definition is essential if one is to understand Bultmann.62 he un-
derstands “myth” to be a specific historical phenomenon and “mythology” 
to be a specific mode of thinking. “Myth” is a report of an event in which 
superhuman, supernatural forces or persons are at work. “Mythology” as 
a worldview refers certain events or phenomena to supernatural powers. 
Thus mythical thinking, in which the world and events in the world are 
“open” to the intervention of otherworldly powers, is directly opposed to 
scientific thinking, in which the world and events within the world are 
“closed” within the causal nexus, i.e., the law of cause and effect.63 
This opposition can be expressed in terms of the individual human 
being as well. in mythical thinking, human beings are open to supernatural 
intervention, whereas in scientific thinking human beings understand their 
existence to be a closed unity of decisions in terms of feeling, thinking, 
willing, responding, and acting.64 Myth objectifies the transcendent in an 
62. The crucial problem in mythology is that mythology seeks to objectify that which 
is either otherworldly or non-objectifiable. This tendency in mythology obscures the 
deeper intention of the myths, which is to express something meaningful about human 
existence. When these myths speak about God in objectifying terms, a new problem 
arises, because for Bultmann any attempt to speak about God inevitably leads to sin 
because to speak about God requires both the objectification of God and also my detach-
ment or distance from the claim of God on me and my life, as the reality determining my 
existence. Thus, to speak about God is atheism and sin; faith, rather, speaks of God as the 
reality that determines my life, as that reality in which i live, move, and have my being 
(acts 17:28). see Bultmann, “Welchen sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?” et: “What does 
it Mean to speak of God?” 
63. see congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 666ff, for a helpful excursus on the 
significance of Bultmann’s views on science and demythologizing. 
64. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 180–82.
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attempt to express the conviction that human beings are grounded in a 
reality that is beyond their control.65 But at the same time, myth intends to 
talk about a reality that lies beyond the limits of objectification. The ques-
tion is whether myths intend simply to talk about the observable world or 
whether myths intend to say something about our reality as human beings, 
and thus of our existence.66
Bultmann asserts that the true intention of myths is to say something 
fundamental about human existence, and because this is so they cannot 
simply be eliminated. There is a tension inherent in myths, for myths si-
multaneously objectify the transcendent and express an understanding of 
human existence. The problem posed by myth is that modern people no 
longer think within the framework of a first-century mythical world-pic-
ture. scientific thinking has rendered the mythology of the new testament 
completely unintelligible to us. christians, however, are presented with the 
word of God in the new testament kerygma. Because the mythical world-
picture of the new testament is meaningless to modern people, it must be 
demythologized and interpreted for the present.67 
Bultmann is often criticized for forcing a modern scientific world-pic-
ture onto the new testament, thus elevating science over scripture. This is a 
misunderstanding of Bultmann’s position, however, because for Bultmann 
the kerygma is above all an eschatological event, not a historical relic. if the 
kerygma truly is God’s address to human beings in their own situation and 
not just to first-century people in the Mediterranean basin, then it should, 
in theory, be possible to demythologize the new testament mythology and 
translate it into the world-picture of any time and any culture, not just our 
own. as congdon suggests, “as long as an existential encounter with the 
eschatological event of christ remains an ongoing possibility, any cultural 
context may be the occasion for the genuine proclamation of the kerygma.”68
65. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 19.
66. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1961), 134.
67. Bultmann here does not take into account the persistence of fundamentalism and 
biblical literalism among substantial portions of modern christianity; instead, he simply 
assumes that all modern christians have been shaped by enlightenment rationalism and 
disenchantment. Presumably, fundamentalist christians and biblical literalists would 
have no problem whatsoever inhabiting a first-century mythical world-picture while 
still using electricity, computers, and modern medicine. one suspects Bultmann would 
accuse them of inconsistency, but the fact remains that there are many christians who 
do inhabit both worlds simultaneously. My thanks to robert saler for raising this issue. 
68. congdon, Mission of Demythologizing, 669. 
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But what, specifically, is the new testament kerygma?69 according to 
Bultmann, it is the proclamation of God’s liberating act in the cross of Jesus 
the christ; it is the proclamation of salvation to a fallen humanity in terms 
of the possibility for authentic human existence. above all, the kerygma 
is the event of God’s personal address to sinners. Because the kerygma is 
above all an event of address here and now, it cannot simply be equated 
with any concrete instantiation of it in any one theology, creed, or world-
picture, not even in that of the new testament itself. Bultmann expresses 
this insight in a letter to Martin heidegger from 1932: 
it is becoming increasingly apparent to me that the central prob-
lem of new testament theology is to say what the christian keryg-
ma actually is. it is never present simply as something given, but 
is always formulated out of a particular believing understanding. 
Moreover, the new testament, almost without exception, does not 
directly contain the kerygma, but rather certain statements (such 
as the Pauline doctrine of justification), in which the believing 
understanding of christian being is developed, are based on the 
kerygma and refer back to it. What the kerygma is can never be 
said conclusively, but must constantly be found anew, because it is 
only actually the kerygma in the carrying out of the proclamation.70
This kerygma, the proclamation of the eschatological liberating act 
of God, is presented mythologically in the new testament, and so it must 
be interpreted. in the new testament expression of the kerygma, the pre-
existent son of God takes on human flesh, dies on the cross as a vicarious 
sacrifice for sin, and is raised on the third day, destroying the power of 
death. This is the essence of the salvific christ-event. But what can this 
mean for modern people who no longer think in terms of this mythology? 
What is the meaning for us of the christ-event and of the kerygma that 
proclaims it? Because this event constitutes the kerygma, it is most impor-
tant that it be carefully interpreted.
69. The word “kerygma” (κηρυγμα) in Greek originally referred to the proclamation 
of a herald. For a helpful study of the use of the term “kerygma” in modern theology, see 
the section “Zum Gebrauch des Wortes ‘Kerygma’ in der neueren Theologie,” in ebeling, 
Theologie und Verkündigung, 109–14. also see the chapter “Kerygma und historischer 
Jesus,” 19–82. et: Theology and Proclamation.
70. Bultmann and heidegger, Briefwechsel, 186, quoted in congdon, Rudolf Bult-
mann, 71. here Bultmann’s line of thinking is consistent with luther’s own insistence on 
a distinction between the Word (Jesus christ) and the Bible, which contains and points 
to the Word. as luther puts it in a memorable image, the Bible is “the swaddling clothes 
and the manger in which christ lies.” luther, “Prefaces to the old testament,” 236. 
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The new testament represents the christ-event as a mythical event, 
and as such it must be demythologized. it is indeed a unique myth, because 
the object of the myth (Jesus the christ) is simultaneously a historical per-
son and a mythical representation, and his destiny is at once historically 
and mythically represented. Throughout the history of modern new testa-
ment interpretation there have been continuous attempts to uncover the 
life of the historical Jesus of nazareth that lies behind the gospel narratives. 
The nineteenth-century lives of Jesus hoped to discover eternal truth and 
moral significance in the life of the man and to uncover what is authentic 
and historically (historisch) true about the accounts of Jesus’ life in order to 
establish a secure foundation for faith. 
Bultmann, however, insists that the quest for the historical Jesus is 
theologically unnecessary and ultimately impossible.71 What is most im-
portant for faith is not the “how” or the “what” of Jesus’ life, but only the 
“that.” Faith should not be interested primarily in the historical details of Je-
sus’ life and ministry, whether he really said a particular word or performed 
a particular deed. rather, what is most important is the simple fact of Jesus’ 
existence. it is “the that, the here and now, the facticity of the person [of 
the earthly Jesus] that constitutes the revelation.”72 here Bultmann counts 
both Paul and John as forefathers, as neither new testament author was 
nearly as concerned with the life of Jesus as they were with the event of Jesus 
the christ.73 and so the kerygma is grounded in the historical Jesus only 
insofar as the historical Jesus is the site of God’s revelation as an event. The 
emphasis here, for Bultmann, should be on the event of God’s revelation in 
71. Bultmann, Jesus, 12ff. some of Bultmann’s own students criticized their teacher 
for creating a seemingly unbridgeable gap between the Jesus of history and the christ of 
faith. see especially Käsemann, “das Problem des historischen Jesus.” et: “Problem of 
the historical Jesus.”
72. Bultmann, “die Bedeutung des geschichtlichen Jesus für die Theologie des Pau-
lus,” 208. et: “significance of the historical Jesus.” see also Bultmann, “der Begriff der 
offenbarung im neuen testament” for his discussion of the concept of revelation in the 
new testament. et: “concept of revelation in the new testament.” For a discussion of 
Bultmann’s concentration on the “that” of Jesus’ life, see ebeling’s essay “das bloße ‘daß’ 
und die lehre von der anhypostasie,” in ebeling, Theologie und Verkündigung, 115–16.
73. despite the fact that Bultmann himself questioned the theological usefulness of 
the historic creeds, in this instance the creeds do corroborate Bultmann’s suggestion that 
the “how” and “what” of Jesus’ life are insignificant for faith, as the creeds move directly 
from Jesus’ birth to his passion, death, resurrection, ascension, and second coming, 
glossing over the entirety of his teachings and deeds. 
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the person of Jesus the christ, not on the historical-biographical details of 
Jesus of nazareth.74 
Bultmann was, of course, aware of the controversy such a dismissive 
attitude toward the significance of the historical Jesus would generate, but 
he was unfazed. his response to his critics in a 1927 essay on christology 
captures something important about Bultmann the theologian: 
They want to know how i rescue myself from the situation cre-
ated by my critical radicalism, how much i can save from the 
fire . . . i have never yet felt uncomfortable with my critical radi-
calism; on the contrary, i have been entirely comfortable. But i 
often have the impression that my conservative new testament 
colleagues feel very uncomfortable, for i see them perpetually 
engaged in salvage operations. i calmly let the fire burn, for i see 
that what is consumed is only the fantasies of life-of-Jesus the-
ology, and that means nothing other than Χριστος κατα σαρξα 
[christ after the flesh].75
The salvation event that occurred in Jesus the christ has meaning only in-
sofar as it can be comprehended in its significance, and the kerygma is only 
valid if it is addressed to individuals in their own situation. if this is to be 
meaningful today, it must be comprehensible and meaningful beyond mere 
Historie; otherwise genuine faith would be impossible without a personal 
relationship with the earthly, historical (historisch) Jesus, which we do not 
have. The salvation event, if it is truly salvific, must be available as a present 
74. This does raise some significant questions about the possibility of having any ac-
cessibility to God’s revelation apart from some knowledge of the historical Jesus, which is 
a thread taken up in earnest by Bultmann’s students, especially ernst Käsemann. 
75. Bultmann, “Zur Frage der christologie,” 100–101. et: “on the Question of chris-
tology.” Berger notes with interest that Bultmann the Christian theologian seems perfectly 
content to allow Bultmann the historian to demolish the historical foundations of chris-
tian faith. Berger, Questions of Faith, 60. however, Berger is creating a false dichotomy 
here between the task of the historian and that of the theologian. Bultmann is content 
both as a theologian and as a historian (and as a christian) to let these fires burn; there is 
no inherent contradiction or conflict for him. however, this is not the case for everyone 
who engages in historical study of the Bible. one prominent example of historical study 
leading a christian theologian to abandon their christian faith is Gerd lüdemann, who 
declared that he had lost his faith as a result of his work as a new testament scholar and 
was subsequently almost fired from his position at the university of Göttingen because 
of pressure from some church bodies. instead, the university changed the name of lüde-
mann’s position from “new testament” to “history and literature of early christianity.” 
see lüdemann, Resurrection of Christ; and lüdemann, Great Deception. 
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reality, not just as a historical relic. But what is the salvation event, and what 
is its significance for contemporary people?
Before addressing the issue of the salvation event proper, it is impor-
tant to understand Bultmann’s understanding of sin, for which salvation is 
the remedy. The Bible presents the picture of a humanity that is not what 
it ought to be, represented as fallenness, as sin. sin for Bultmann means 
inauthentic existence: human beings exist inauthentically, that is, we insist 
on clinging to the past, desperately working to guarantee our own existence 
through the false security of our own efforts. human beings refuse to be 
open to the future and we refuse to submit ourselves to the God who calls 
to us from the future. The new testament kerygma addresses us in our 
sinfulness and exposes our inauthentic existence. sin is rebellion against 
God because it is ingratitude for God’s gift of grace. The grace of God is the 
love that encounters human beings in their fallenness, a love that accepts 
us in spite of what Bultmann calls our “radical highhandedness” (radikale 
Eigenmächtigkeit).76 
The grace of God offers us the future: it offers us freedom from our 
fallen, backward-looking selves to be our authentic selves. Thus God’s 
gracious gift of faith is the condition for the possibility of authentic hu-
man freedom. Faith is possible only in light of God’s gift of freedom for 
the future. Faith is trust in the God who offers us authentic existence in 
the future, and thus faith is our decision for, our wholehearted “yes” to, 
this authentic existence.77 Thus forgiveness of sin is not the forswearing 
of punishment, but it is the gift of freedom from self-incurred bondage to 
ourselves, from our past. it is freedom for obedience to the God who calls 
us to freedom. But this freedom, this forgiveness of sin, is possible only in 
light of the salvation event of the cross.
Before discussing the meaning of the christ-event, Bultmann believes 
it is first necessary to demythologize the new testament account. The ques-
tion for Bultmann is whether this is possible. The christ-event as recorded 
in the new testament differs from hellenic cultic myths, for example, in 
that the new testament myth takes as its object a historical person. The 
divine pre-existent logos is also the historical Jesus of nazareth, and his 
destiny is not only mythical but is also a human life that ends with his death 
76. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 38.
77. ibid. This grace is offered from God as totaliter aliter (totally other) because the 
word of God is addressed to us externally, from God the wholly other. it is because of 
this external character of the word that we encounter God always as God encounters us 
in our own situation. see Bultmann, “Welchen sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?,” 29ff.
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on the cross. The cross is a historical event that is at the same time presented 
as a mythical event, alongside the mythical event of the resurrection that 
is also presented as a historical event. This intertwining of the historical 
and mythical creates particular difficulties for the interpreter who wishes to 
distinguish the historical from the mythical. The question is whether these 
narratives intend to express something that happened to the historical Jesus 
or whether their true intention is to express something else. For Bultmann 
the significance of the historical Jesus lies not in the facts and events of 
his life, but in what God says to humanity through this particular person.78 
This intention becomes especially clear in the question of the significance 
of the cross and resurrection of Jesus. 
Jesus’ death on the cross is a historically verifiable event. Through 
historical research, historians can verify that a Jewish man named Jesus 
was crucified by the romans in the vicinity of Jerusalem in the first third of 
the first century ce. But the christian conviction that this cross is Christ’s 
cross, that it is the event of God’s salvific act, cannot be verified as a histori-
cal event. The meaning and significance of the cross can only be compre-
hended with the eyes of faith (Glaubensaugen).79 in the new testament the 
event of the cross is also represented as a mythical event. The son of God is 
lifted up on the cross as a sacrifice of atonement, and the death of a sinless 
God-man placates God’s wrath as a vicarious sacrifice for the sins of the 
world.80 But can the cross be understood in its significance apart from the 
mythical representation of it in the new testament? it is theology’s task to 
interpret the historical event of the cross in its historic significance for faith. 
if this is not possible, then christian faith has lost its foundation. 
to believe in the cross of christ is not to believe in the mythical pro-
cess that takes place entirely outside of us, nor is it to believe in a historical 
event that occurred two thousand years ago. For Bultmann, to believe in 
the cross is to believe that it is Christ’s cross, and that God has acted in the 
cross pro nobis and, more importantly, pro me.81 The cross as the salvation 
event is not only something that happened to one historical person long 
ago, but more significantly it is a cosmic event that happens in the eschato-
logical here and now, through the preached word, and thus to participate 
78. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 41.
79. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 196.
80. Whether this is the only way to understand the atoning power of the cross is cer-
tainly debatable. For a summary of atonement theories, see schmiechen, Saving Power. 
81. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 46.
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in the cross of christ is to be willing to be crucified with christ, to take 
christ’s cross as one’s own cross. The cross is not merely a historical event: 
it is a historic event with origins in the historical event of the crucifixion of 
Jesus of nazareth. it is an event with historic significance because it is the 
cross of Christ, through which God liberates the world. But is it not possible 
to understand the cross as Christ’s cross only by first being convinced of the 
significance of christ? Would we not have to understand it as the cross of 
the historical Jesus before we understand it as the cross of christ? We know 
about the cross only as a historical event, but the new testament does not 
proclaim the cross merely as a historical event, but as a cosmic, historic 
event. Jesus is proclaimed to be the crucified and risen lord, and thus cross 
and resurrection belong together as a unity.82
The resurrection is presented in the new testament as a mythical 
event. The dead man Jesus is returned to bodily life and appears to his 
followers. after forty days of walking the earth he ascends bodily into 
heaven. This presentation also must be demythologized if the kerygma 
it proclaims is to be made intelligible to modern people. What are these 
mythical elements in the texts attempting to express? What is their mean-
ing for us? The meaning of the resurrection is that death is not the end, 
that God has acted in the cross to free humanity from the bonds of death. 
The resurrection is an expression of the meaning of the cross, that the 
cross is Christ’s cross. The resurrection is an object of faith for Bultmann, 
and as such it cannot be a self-authenticating miracle.83 The believer 
cannot convince a doubter that the cross is an eschatological event by 
referring to the resurrection as proof, because the resurrection cannot 
be established as a historical event. Faith in the resurrection is not faith 
in a historical event, but it is faith in the cross as the salvation event, and 
because the cross is the salvation event it is the cross of christ. otherwise 
it is nothing more than the tragic end of a noble man.
But how are we to believe that the cross is the salvation event? Bult-
mann insists that we believe because it is proclaimed as such. The crucified 
and risen one encounters each of us in the kerygma, the word of procla-
mation, and nowhere else.84 Faith in the resurrection is thus faith in this 
word of proclamation, that it is God’s address and summons to us in our 
situation. easter faith is the faith that this kerygma is the legitimate word 
82. ibid., 41–44.
83. ibid., 45.
84. ibid., 46.
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of God, and this word is itself an eschatological event. in the proclamation 
of the crucified and risen one, this event occurs in the present: the risen 
christ is encountered here and now in the preached word. in other words, 
christ has risen into the proclamation of the church.85 This word proclaims 
that God’s grace has already acted pro me. This word is grounded in the 
death of the historical person of Jesus as the eschatological event, but the 
significance of this gracious act is comprehended only in God’s personal 
address through the word proclaimed to me here and now. This word is the 
event in and through which God meets us, offers us forgiveness, and opens 
the future for our authentic existence.86
What does it mean to have faith in the resurrection? Bultmann has 
already established that faith in the resurrection is not belief in a historical 
event, but that faith in the resurrection is trusting that God has acted for us 
and for our salvation in the cross of christ. But how does this act become 
available for us in our situation? in other words, what is the significance of 
the resurrection for faith?
critics have charged Bultmann with inconsistently applying his 
method of demythologizing by not fully demythologizing God and God’s 
act in the cross.87 in a lecture entitled “The Meaning of God as acting,”88 
Bultmann addresses the issue of the act of God in terms of his program 
85. While not always rooted in the same theological assumptions, the presence of 
christ in the proclamation of the gospel is portrayed quite vividly in many “high church” 
christian traditions (e.g., orthodox, catholics, anglicans, lutherans), many of whom 
stand for the proclamation of the gospel after the gospel book has been processed with 
attendant crucifer and torchbearers into the midst of the assembled congregation and in 
some traditions also censed and blessed by the gospeler. 
86. Bultmann, Jesus, 199–200. see also Bultmann’s essay “der Begriff des Wortes 
Gottes im neuen testament.” et: “concept of the Word of God.”
87. The most noteworthy of these critics, Karl Barth, outlines these inconsistencies 
in his essay Rudolf Bultmann. schubert ogden, in an article on “The debate on ‘demy-
thologizing’,” discusses these charges at some length. For a more thorough presentation 
of ogden’s own criticisms of Bultmann’s position, see ogden, Christ without Myth.
88. Bultmann delivered this lecture at yale university in october of 1951 as one 
of the schaeffer lectures, and again at Vanderbilt university in november of the same 
year as one of the cole lectures. it is available in Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 
60–85. he also treats this topic in a section on “die rede vom handeln Gottes” in “Zum 
Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 196–208. For Bultmann’s discussion of the 
distinction between act (Handeln) and wonder or miracle (Wunder), see Bultmann, “Zur 
Frage des Wunders.” et: “Question of Wonder.” 
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of demythologizing. The primary question in his discussion is whether all 
speech of God as acting necessarily must be mythological speech.89
in mythological thinking the act of God is understood as an action 
that intervenes between the natural, historical, or psychological course 
of events, whereby “the divine causality is inserted as a link in the chain 
of events which follow one another according to the causal nexus.”90 The 
act of God can be understood non-mythologically only if it is understood 
as happening not between worldly events, but as happening within them. 
Thus the closed connection of cause and effect remains intact to the ob-
server.91 The act of God remains hidden and it can be perceived as God’s 
act only with the eyes of faith. God’s act remains hidden within the natural 
course of events to the believer and the non-believer alike, but insofar as 
believers see the event in its significance, as something happening to them 
here and now in light of God’s word, then they can and must accept it 
as God’s act.92 God’s acts cannot be empirically detected and observed as 
God’s acts because God’s acts cannot be objectified. They remain hidden 
to the observer, but the christian believes that God is working here and 
now within these events. Faith “nevertheless” (dennoch) understands as 
God’s act an event that is completely intelligible in the natural and his-
torical nexus of cause and effect, without remainder. This “nevertheless” is 
therefore inseparable from faith.93
89. Bultmann argues that it is possible to speak non-mythologically about God. his 
contemporary, Paul tillich, disagrees and insists that religious language is always neces-
sarily symbolic and mythical language precisely because religious language speaks of the 
infinite, unconditioned divine reality that, by its very nature, is inexpressible by anything 
other than symbol and myth. The key, for tillich, is not to eliminate the myth but to 
recognize the myth as myth (what he calls “broken myth”) so that the myth is not taken 
literally, thereby becoming idolatrous. see tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 47–62. This ap-
proach is taken up in different registers by reinhold niebuhr and sallie McFague, among 
others. see dorrien, Word as True Myth, chapters 3 and 5. 
90. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 61.
91. While Bultmann proposes this distinction in order to keep the causal nexus 
intact, contemporary american philosopher of religion richard Grigg insists that here 
especially theology cannot escape the scientific implications of its claims. he argues that 
any theological claim for God’s action in the world must in principle be accessible to 
scientific observation if it is to be credible, which means that any assertion of God’s ac-
tion in the world must meet the standards of proof set by science. For Grigg, the only 
theological position that can meet these standards is pantheism. see Grigg, Beyond the 
God Delusion. 
92. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 64.
93. ibid., 65. There are intriguing points of contact between Bultmann’s description 
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The question remains: how are we to speak of God as acting if we are 
to avoid mythological language? Bultmann argues that speech of God as 
acting on me is to be understood not mythologically, but rather analogi-
cally. When we speak of God as blessing, judging, addressing, etc., we speak 
of God’s action as an analogue to interpersonal human actions.94 There are 
two important consequences of this distinction. First, only such statements 
about God are legitimate as express the existential relationship between hu-
man beings and God. second, images used to describe God as acting are 
only legitimate if they intend to speak of God analogically and not literally 
as a personal being acting on persons.95
Because Bultmann argues for such an analogical understanding, the 
objection can be raised that God’s action becomes a merely subjective, psy-
chological experience. This implies that God exists only in the inner life 
of the soul and not as a transcendent reality. Bultmann argues that faith 
cannot defend itself against the charge that it is an illusion, but nevertheless 
“faith” does not denote a psychologically subjective quality. Faith is hear-
ing and responding to the word of God addressed to me in my concrete, 
historical situation. The fact that this word is God’s word cannot be demon-
strated objectively. God’s word is hidden in scripture just as God’s acts are 
hidden everywhere. The fact that God cannot be apprehended apart from 
faith does not mean that God does not exist apart from faith.96
here Bultmann’s argument is reminiscent of the classical polarity of 
fides qua creditur and fides quae creditur, the subjective and objective poles 
of God’s acts occurring within events and John caputo’s description of God as the name 
we give to that which is happening within events but which cannot be contained by 
them. But whereas Bultmann’s God remains in some sense an ontological reality outside 
the event (a theology that caputo calls “strong” and “ontotheology”), caputo’s God is 
the name for “we know not what” is happening in the event, leading caputo to call his 
own theology “weak” and “hauntology.” see caputo, Weakness of God. The French post-
Marxist philosopher alain Badiou also turns to Paul’s treatments of the resurrection and 
grace to theorize the event in Saint Paul. 
94. see Betz, “concept of the ‘inner human Being.’” in a footnote, Betz quotes Bult-
mann’s statement about the anthropology of the new testament from Bultmann’s Theol-
ogy of the New Testament: “every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion 
about man and vice versa. For this reason and in this sense Paul’s theology is, at the same 
time, anthropology. . . . Thus, every assertion about christ is also an assertion about man 
and vice versa; and Paul’s christology is simultaneously soteriology.” Bultmann, Theology 
of the New Testament, 1:191, quoted in Betz, “concept of the ‘inner human Being’,” 315, 
n. 1.
95. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 69–70.
96. ibid., 72. 
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of faith, as well as luther’s exposition of the First commandment in the 
large catechism where luther suggests that 
to have a god is nothing other than to trust and believe in that one 
from the heart . . . the trust and faith of the heart alone make both 
God and idol. if your faith and trust are right, then your God is 
the true one, and in turn where your trust is false and wrong, there 
you do not have the true God. For the two belong together, faith 
and God. anything on which your heart relies and depends, i say, 
that is really your god.97
For Bultmann, as for luther, God’s existence is not dependent on faith, so 
that it is my faith that somehow produces God’s existence. rather, God’s 
existence is ontologically prior to my faith, but it remains purely external 
and indeed meaningless for me until i relate to God in trusting faith. 
Because God’s actions cannot be objectified, because the events of re-
demption cannot be rationally, empirically, or historically demonstrated,98 
and because it is possible to speak of such things only when individuals 
are ultimately concerned with their own existence, then faith must be 
a new understanding of personal existence.99 in other words, God’s act 
bestows a new understanding of myself. Bultmann addresses a common 
misunderstanding of this particular position: the self-understanding of 
personal existence is confused with philosophical analysis of the human 
being. The existential understanding of the significance and meaning of 
my own life authentically pursued (das Existentielle) is confused with 
existentialist philosophical analysis (das Existential).100 it is existential-
ist analysis that clarifies that my existential self-understanding is realized 
97. luther, “large catechism,” 386.
98. as lessing and Kant famously put it, the historical serves only for illustration, not 
for demonstration. 
99. This new understanding can be expressed in terms of heidegger’s phrase Dasein-
in-der-Welt (“Being-in-the-World”). For Bultmann, true faith is a matter of the believer’s 
understanding of this “Being-in-the-World.” Bultmann maintains a distinctive relation-
ship between Glauben and Verstehen (faith and understanding), which he discusses in 
his essay “Theologie als Wissenschaft.” et: “Theology as science.” For a discussion of the 
relationship and the distinction between Glauben und Verstehen in Bultmann’s theology, 
see Jüngel, Glauben und Verstehen. Jüngel discusses Bultmann’s conception of theology 
in terms of its characterization as a science (Wissenschaft), the proper boundaries of 
theology (for example, theology must have a specific object—namely, God—if it is to be 
called “theology”: talk about God), faith as understanding of truth, and the truth of the 
moment, among others.
100. Bultmann borrows this distinction from heidegger. 
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only in the here and now.101 Theologically, Bultmann argues that in faith 
we continuously understand ourselves anew. This new self-understanding 
is maintained only as a continual response to God’s word, which pro-
claims God’s act in Jesus the christ.102
But this raises a further question: if one speaks of God as acting on the 
individual in the concrete here and now, how can it be maintained that God 
has acted once for all in the cross? Bultmann suggests that the idea of the 
eternal God becomes effectively real in an individual’s existence by God’s 
word spoken in the here and now. God’s word is eternal, but not timeless. 
This eternity is conceived as God’s eternal presence always actualized in the 
here and now, i.e., in time.103 God’s word is not a collection of propositions 
and doctrines demanding intellectual assent, but an event happening in my 
own concrete situation here and now, addressed to me in time from outside 
myself. in this sense God’s word is truly the verbum externum.
God’s word is transmitted through human language, through the 
Bible and the church. This word originated in history, in the historical 
event of Jesus the christ. God’s act in the cross of Jesus cannot be objecti-
fied or proved, and yet the christian believes that this is an eschatological, 
salvific event. Jesus the christ is the eschatological event, and the question 
for demythologizing is whether this understanding is inseparable from the 
new testament conceptions of cosmological eschatology.104 The key for 
Bultmann is found in the Gospel of John’s unique eschatology.105 in John, 
cosmological eschatology is understood as a historical, realized eschatol-
ogy. to live in faith is to live an eschatological existence, to pass from death 
to life, right now. This eschatological existence is already realized in a new 
self-understanding in response to the word, and the eschatological event 
of Jesus the christ happens here and now as the word is proclaimed. The 
101. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 74.
102. For a discussion of Bultmann’s treatment of faith as a new self-understanding, 
see Jüngel, Glauben und Verstehen, 65–67.
103. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 79. tillich also utilizes this distinction in 
a sermon entitled “The eternal now.” 
104. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 81.
105. see Bultmann’s Das Evangelium des Johannes for his treatment of the Fourth 
Gospel as a whole. et: Gospel of John. see also his “die eschatologie des Johannes-evan-
gelium” for his specific treatment of John’s eschatology. et: “eschatology of the Gospel 
of John.”
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“once for all” is understood, not as a historical event, but as an eschatologi-
cal event.106
This event is present for me in the preaching of the word. The word 
does proclaim that God’s grace has already acted in the past for me, but not 
in a way that i can objectively understand through historical research and 
reconstruction. God’s grace is present here and now as the eschatological 
event, with its origins in the historical event of Jesus the christ. This event 
is “once for all” because the word that is preached here and now is the same 
word that has been preached for two millennia. it is only in light of this 
proclaimed word that what has happened or what is happening here or 
there assumes the character of God’s act for those who have faith in God.107
What does it mean to have faith, for Bultmann?108 christian faith in its 
most basic sense is trust in the promise of God given in the gospel, and this 
faith opens me to the future. Faith includes the recognition that as a human 
being i am incapable of saving myself from my own past and am therefore 
also incapable of existing authentically for the future. Because faith as trust 
in God is faith that God will make my authentic existence possible, faith is 
also obedience and submission to the God who judges me and who gives 
me grace. This faith is justifying faith, in that through faith the sinner is 
made righteous. Faith is also hope, in that it is readiness for and acceptance 
of the unknown future that God opens up for me.109 Finally, faith is free-
dom, for through God’s gracious gift of faith i have the freedom to decide 
for authentic existence. This gift of freedom liberates me from myself and 
from my past, setting me free for loving openness to the world.110
106. congdon goes so far as to suggest that, contrary to typical assumptions that 
Bultmann’s chief concerns are hermeneutics and existential analysis, Bultmann should 
be understood first and foremost as an eschatological theologian. in fact, the first chapter 
of congdon’s introduction to Bultmann’s thought is devoted to Bultmann’s views on es-
chatology, not myth and demythologizing. see congdon, Rudolf Bultmann, 1–13. 
107. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 85.
108. For a more systematic treatment of faith, including its three “classical” com-
ponents (notitia, assensus, fiducia—knowledge, assent, and trust), see Bultmann’s fifth 
chapter, “der Begriff des Glaubens,” in Theologische Enzyklopädie, 97–170. et: What Is 
Theology? For his discussion of God as the object of faith (fides quae creditur) and of 
the eschatological act of God as the theme of theology, see Bultmann, “Theologie als 
Wissenschaft.” 
109. For a short discussion of the concept of hope in the context of demythologizing, 
see Bultmann’s essay, “die christliche hoffnung und das Problem der entmythologisier-
ung.” et: “christian hope and the Problem of demythologizing.”
110. see Bultmann’s section on “das menschliche sein im Glauben” in “neues 
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Faith is grounded in God’s revelation in a historical person.111 But 
faith is also eschatological, in that God encounters me in the present 
through the kerygma, through what Bultmann calls the Christus praesens.112 
God offers forgiveness and authentic existence in my current situation, 
and thus faith requires a decision in each new moment. God’s gracious 
act in the cross is the condition for the possibility of faith, so that faith 
becomes a response both to God’s past act and to God’s address to me 
in the present. Because faith is possible only in relation to God’s address 
in the proclamation of the gospel, it follows that faith must be created 
in each new moment. true faith is only possible when i act, when i am 
confronted with a summons to respond to the word. Faith in this sense is 
not intellectual assent to a series of doctrinal propositions, but a free act 
of trusting, affirmative response to God’s saving word addressed to me in 
my own existence.113 Faith is the obedient hearing of this word of law and 
gospel—the word that condemns me as a sinner and offers forgiveness in 
christ—and as such faith is inseparable from the word.114
The christian kerygma is the proclamation of God’s eschatological act 
in Jesus the christ. This is the message of the new testament: the gospel, the 
good news. This is the message that meets people in the proclamation of the 
word, and this is the message that offers each hearer the opportunity for deci-
sion. Faith is possible only when this message is proclaimed, as Paul writes, 
“for faith comes through what is heard, and what is heard comes through the 
word of christ” (rom. 10:17). to hear this word is to hear God’s offer of for-
giveness and of liberation: it is the “word of reconciliation” (2 cor. 5:18–19). 
This word of the cross makes the cross comprehensible as the salvation event 
by demanding faith. This faith is not mere belief in the historical facticity of 
Jesus’ life and death, but much more than that: it is the individual’s whole-
hearted “yes” to God’s word of address. Because the truth of the kerygma 
testament und Mythologie,” 29–31.
111. Bultmann, “der Begriff der offenbarung im neuen testament.” et: “concept of 
revelation.” see also the ninth paragraph of his third chapter on “die erkennbarkeit 
Gottes in der existenz durch die offenbarung,” 59–65, and the eleventh paragraph of his 
fourth chapter on “die offenbarung als geschichtliche ereignis,” 88–96, in Bultmann, 
Theologische Enzyklopädie.
112. For more on this feature of Bultmann’s thought, see Kay, Christus Praesens. 
113. Bultmann, “Welchen sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?,” 36.
114. This twin emphasis on faith and the word is captured in the title of a collection of 
essays by one of Bultmann’s most famous students, Gerhard ebeling. see ebeling, Wort 
und Glaube. et: Word and Faith. 
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cannot be verified by historical research, because the significance of God’s 
eschatological act in the cross cannot be proved, and because the ground and 
object of faith are the same (namely, God), this faith involves a risk: 
Those who want to have faith in God as their God must know that 
they hold nothing in hand in which they can believe; that they are, 
as it were, poised mid-air and can demand no proof of the truth 
of the word that has been spoken to them. For the ground and the 
object of faith are identical. only the one who abandons all secu-
rity can find security, only the one who—to speak with luther—is 
prepared to enter into the inner darkness.115
There can be no security in faith, for in faith one abandons security for 
the sake of radical openness to the future. Faith is a risk precisely because 
the truth of the kerygma cannot be proved and because the future is un-
known to us. to seek for security or proof for faith is to ask God to justify 
Godself, which is a refusal to let God be God. This is the scandal of the new 
testament. The paradox of faith—that the revelation of God occurs in a 
historical figure, that God is revealed most fully in the humiliating death of 
a condemned criminal,116 that the church and its proclamation are historical 
and yet eschatological phenomena—cannot be overcome by means of sci-
entific explanations or historical investigations, but only in trusting faith. 
as Bultmann asserts, it is precisely because these things cannot be proved 
that the christian kerygma is secure against the charge that it is mythology. 
The transcendence of God is not made immanent in such a way as to negate 
God’s transcendence, as in myth; rather, the paradox of the presence of the 
transcendent God in history is affirmed: “the word became flesh.”117
115. Bultmann, “Zum Problem der entmythologisierung” (1952), 207. here Bultmann 
makes an interesting connection between his program of radical demythologizing and the 
Pauline-lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone. he understands his own program 
to be a consistent application of the lutheran doctrine of justification to epistemology: 
just as the doctrine of justification cures us of any hope for security through our works, so 
radical demythologizing cures us of any hope for security through our knowledge. 
116. This is the heart of the lutheran theology of the cross. For more on this aspect of 
lutheran thought, see saler, Theologia Crucis. 
117. Bultmann, “neues testament und Mythologie,” 48. david congdon makes the 
intriguing argument that Bultmann, finally, should be understood as a theologian of ad-
vent. see congdon, Rudolf Bultmann, which concludes with a chapter on advent. 
